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RECENT CASE
LABOR PAINS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
WILLIAM BURNS
"New York Times-April 27, 1974: The International Bottle-
Blowers Union is threatening to shut down the beer industry in the
United States. The union has called for a nationwide walkout of
beer bottle blowers because the Bottle Corporation of America, the
nation's largest beer bottle manufacturer, has refused to agree to
the union's wage demands.
"The Bottle Corporation of America recently purchased the
plant and business of International Bottle, the company with whom
the Bottle Blowers had a collective bargaining agreement. The union
demands that the Bottle Corporation pays the same wages as called
for under the old contract. The Bottle Corporation has steadfastly
refused to concede to the union demand. Spokesmen for the union
said that this whole problem would not have arisen had the Bottle
Corporation been bound by International Bottle's contract."
This hypothetical situation has a distinct possibility of occurring
because the Second Circuit recently held in William J. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B.,' that a new employer is not bound by
his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
2 The old employer
in Burns was the Wackenhut Corporation. Wackenhut provided the
security guards for the Lockheed Aircraft Service Company facility
at Ontario Airport, Ontario, California. On March 8, 1967, the
United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 162, was certified by
the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the
Board) as the exclusive bargaining agent of Wackenhut's employees
at Lockheed. A collective bargaining agreement was signed by Wac-
kenhut and the union which was to run from April 26, 1967, until
April 28, 1970. Subsequently, Wackenhut's one year contract with
Lockheed expired. Pursuant to its agreement with Wackenhut, Lock-
heed requested bids for the guard service contract. Lockheed then
awarded the contract to the low bidder, William J. Burns Inter-
national Detective Agency. When Burns commenced work it em-
ployed 42 guards at the Lockheed facility, 27 of whom had worked
for Wackenhut. The union demanded that Burns recognize it as the
bargaining agent of Burn's Lockheed employees and honor the con-
1 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 99 (1971).
2 Id. at 916.
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tract between the union and Wackenhut. When Burns refused tohonor these demands, the union filed unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. The union charged Burns with violations of sections8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of1947.' The Board found that Burns was a successor-employer and,
as such, was obligated to bargain with the union and honor the con-tract. Burns appealed to the Second Circuit who refused to enforcethat part of the Board's order which required Burns to honor the
existing collective bargaining agreement. The court stated that:
1. Burns was Wackenhut's successor and was required to bar-
gain with the union; 4
2. The Board may not impose a collective bargaining agree-
ment upon a party who has had no part in the negotiation of the
agreement; 5
3. The successor may be compelled only to arbitrate issues
arising under the contract; 6
4. The Board's hardship rule in Emerald Maintenance, Inc.'
should not be applied.'
The holding of the Second Circuit is in direct conflict with thedecision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-cuit in Ranch-Way, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. In order to resolve the question
of a successor's obligation under his predecessor's labor contract,the United States Supreme Court has granted the Board's petitionfor certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision in Burns.'° Thefollowing discussion will critically analyze the four points raised bythe Second Circuit and suggest that the Supreme Court overrule thedecision of the Second Circuit and reach a conclusion similar to that
of the Tenth Circuit.
8 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1947).
4 441 F.2d at 915.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 916.
7 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971).
8 441 F.2d at 916.
9 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971). The Tenth Circuit compelled the purchaserof a feed mill to honor the collective bargaining agreement his predecessor hadnegotiated. The Tenth Circuit found that 18 of the 25 employees covered by theunion contract were hired by Ranch-Way, the successor, that the business conductedwas substantially the same as it had been before the sale, and that over seventy-fivepercent of the former customers continued with Ranch-Way. The Ranch-Way caseis not discussed herein, because the court did not discuss in depth its reasons for
enforcing the contract.
10 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 99 (1971).
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SUCCESSORSHIP
Before a contract will bind a new company, the company must
be a successor. A successor-employer is a term used by the Board to
define a company which takes over or replaces another company and
remains in substantially the same type of business with a majority
of the old company's employees. The old company is known as the
predecessor-employer. 1 ' This determination is essential to finding
that a successor is bound to his predecessor's labor contract because
successorship establishes that the new company has carried on the
same business as the old company. In order to determine whether the
business has remained the same, the Board and courts have tradi-
tionally placed emphasis upon such factors as whether the same plant
is used, the same product is made or services rendered, the same
jobs are continued under the same working conditions, and sub-
stantially the same work force is employed.12 When the business
has been continued, enforcing the collective bargaining agreement is
not an unreasonable burden on the new company. The labor con-
tract is directly related to the new employer because he has taken
over the business which is covered by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
l3
The Second Circuit found that Burns was Wackenhut's suc-
cessor. The court ordered Burns to bargain with the union, but
refused to enforce the existing labor contract. 4 In so holding the
court makes an unreasonable distinction. Although the reasons for
compelling bargaining and imposing a contract on a successor are
motivated by different reasons, successorship which supports the
duty to bargain also supports the duty to honor a preexisting col-
lective bargaining agreement.
The Duty to Bargain
When a union has been certified by the Board as the bargaining
agent for a group of employees, section 8(d) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 19471 imposes upon the company the
11 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 5, 74
L.R.R.M. 1098, 1100 (1970).
12 See Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969);
Makela Welding, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 387 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1967); Overnite Transp.
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B. v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219
(10th Cir. 1962); N.L.R.B. v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960);
N.L.R.B. v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
13 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text, infra.
14 441 F.2d at 916.
15 Section 8(d) reads as follows: "For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
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duty to bargain with the union. The duty to bargain continues until
the employees no longer wish to be represented by the union. If the
company is sold or replaced, as in Burns, the duty to bargain may
continue. In order for the bargaining obligation to pass to the new
employer, he must be a successor. 6 That is, the business the old
company conducted must remain the same under the new company.This requirement has been established by the Board because the
employees would have no reason to terminate the union as their
representative when the business of the company remains the samedespite a change in ownership. In fact, the status of successorship
may create a presumption that the employees desire the incumbent
union to continue as their bargaining agent.'7
Hiring the old Employees. In determining who is a successor,
the greatest emphasis has been placed upon the number of the old
company's employees who are hired by the new company. In almost
every case where an employer was found to be a successor, the court
emphasized that a majority of the old employees were retained by
the successor.'8
By stressing this factor, the courts have recognized two things.First, the employees of the successor company have the right toform, join, or assist labor orgainizations of their own choosing.' If
a majority of a predecessor's employees work for the successor, it islikely that they are content with the labor union they have chosen.The successor should not be allowed to object to his employees'
choice of representatives. Conversely, where less than a majority
of the predecessor's employees work for the successor, the new
employees should be allowed to select their representative. Second,
where the new company employs a majority of the old company's
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in goodfaith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and theexecution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
by either party, . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1947).16 See William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911(2d Cir. 1971).
'7 See Makela Welding, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 387 F.2d 40, 46 (6th Cir. 1967):If, because of essential similarity of operations, Kemp can properly be re-garded as Makela's successor, the absence of proof of majority status at thetime of the bargaining demand would not necessarily undermine the Board'sfinding. [Where the Board ruled that a successor had to remedy a pre-
decessor's unfair labor practice].18 See Ranch-Way, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971); WilliamJ. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971); Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v N.L.R.B., 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969); N.L.R.B. v. AutoVentshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960). Where an employer hired less thana majority of his predecessor's employees, see N.L.R.B. v. Alamo White Truck Ser-
vice, Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959).
19 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 1952).
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work force, it is probable that the nature of the predecessor's business
has been continued by the new employer.
2 0 A new employer is not
likely to retain employees unless they are capable of producing his
product or providing the services he performs. In Burns, the William
Burns Detective Agency retained Wackenhut's work force because
they were able to perform the same duties for Burns as they did for
Wackenhut. The fact that Burns hired the old employees indicates
that Burns conducted a business similar to Wackenhut's.
Challenging the Union. In determining if the union still repre-
sents a majority of the successor's employees, the Board looks to the
time of succession, not some later date.
2 The fact that at a later
date, as in Burns, the union no longer represents a majority of the
predecessor's employees because of a turnover in the successor's
personnel is not evidence per se that there is no longer a majority
interest in the union.22 If this were the case, a union certification
could be challenged whenever the predecessor's employees who voted
for the union ceased to comprise a majority of the successor's em-
ployees. This would be an unacceptable infringement upon the
employees' right to pick the union of their choice,
2 3 particularly in
an industry with a large turnover. In order to oust the union, it
must be shown that a substantial number of the successor's employ-
ees no longer wish to be represented by the union.
4
There are two additional provisions which protect the employ-
ees' choice of representatives. The certification bar
25 prevents a chal-
lenge to the incumbent union for a period of 12 months from the
date of certification of the union by the Board. The contract bar
26
prevents questioning the majority status of the union for the dura-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is not proper for an employer to refuse to recognize a union
because he believes the union no longer represents a majority of his
employees. The choice of union representatives is the prerogative
of the employees and it is up to them to file for decertification.
27 If
the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement is still in force and
20 Cf. Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 1300 (1964).
21 N.L.R.B. v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1960).
22 N.L.R.B. v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 1952).
23 Labor Management Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
24 Kraft Food Co., 76 N.L.R.B. No. 77, at 492, 21 L.R.R.M. 1214, 1214 (1948).
25 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1947).
26 The contract bar is a rule established by the Board to prevent elections
within the bargaining unit for the duration of the contract. 1970 GuIDEBOOK To LABOR
RELATIONS 90 (10th ed. Commerce Clearing House Pub. 1970).
27 Decertification is an action by which the Board conducts an election in the
bargaining unit to establish that the recognized union is no longer the chosen bar-
gaining representative of a majority of the employees in the unit. Id. at 106.
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binds the successor, the union should be free from challenge under
the protection of the contract bar.
The Duty to Honor the Collective Bargaining Agreement
While the Second Circuit held that Burns must bargain with
the union selected by his predecessor's employees, it did not impose
upon Burns the duty to honor the existing collective bargaining
agreement." This appears to be an unreasonable limitation upon the
rights of the employees.
Not only does successorship require a successor-employer to
recognize the union as his employees' bargaining agent, but it also
supports the conclusion that the new employer is obligated tohonor his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. The factors2"
the Board considers in determining successorship may indicate that
the business conducted by the old company has not changed. This
conclusion is essential if the Board's rule in Burns is to be fairly
applied to the successor. The predecessor's contract was keyed to
the particular needs of his business. The type of work, the working
conditions, the rates of pay, and hours of work were related to hisbusiness and the work his employees performed. Unless the new
company takes over the predecessor's business and is conducting itin substantially the same fashion, the existing bargaining agree-
ment will have no relation to the work the new company performs.
Hence, the contract would be an unreasonable burden on the new
employer. For example, suppose that Company X engages in thebusiness of commercial printing. In order to expand, X decides topurchase Company Y which operates a warehouse. Company X de-
cides to keep one half of Company Y's work force and retain them.Company Y had a collective bargaining agreement with the Ware-housemen's Union. Under X none of Y's job classifications are
retained. The work is no longer the same, hence working conditions
will have changed. The wages and hours under the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement bear no relation to the work that
will be performed for X. Where successorship is not found, the labor
contract bears no reasonable relation to the new employer and should
not bind himA°
However, when the new company is operating the same business
as the predecessor-employer, the existing contract will relate directly
to the new employer. Where nothing has been changed by the suc-
28 441 F.2d at 916.
29 See text accompanying note 12, supra.
80 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Alamo White Truck Service, Inc., 273 F.2d 238, 240, 242 (5th
Cir. 1959).
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cessor but the ownership, the contract covers the same items under
both predecessor and successor-employers. In Burns, the trial ex-
aminer 3 found that Burns was a successor-employer from these
facts: sixty-four percent of Wackenhut's employees continued to
work for Burns; practically the same facilities were used; the work-
ing conditions were the same; and the services provided were the
same. He also noted that both Wackenhut and Burns were large
national firms with an annual gross volume of business in excess
of $500,000.32 Thus, it may be inferred that the interests of both
companies are likely to be similar. Their labor policies would be
those of large corporations not those of small companies. Because
they are both large firms with numerous contracts to provide guard
services throughout the nation, imposing the labor contract on Burns
would not likely drive it out of business.
Thus, Wackenhut's collective bargaining agreement covered the
same working conditions as Burns's. There is no hardship for
Burns to take over Wackenhut's obligations under the contract
because Burns, having been found to be a successor, stands in the
same position as Wackenhut.3 The agreement which covered Wac-
kenhut's employees is their protection against unilateral changes by
their employer. This protection should not be removed because the
owner of the business has changed while the men and the business
conducted which the contract covered has not.
The Second Circuit held that Burns should not be bound by the
existing collective bargaining agreement.34 This decision fails to
take into account the similarity of the factual situations when a
successor takes over a business from his predecessor. The conclusion
that the contract should bind the successor follows from this sim-
ilarity.
IMPOSITION OF THE CONTRACT UPON A PARTY WHO
HAS NOT BARGAINED
When an employer and a union have not reached a collective
bargaining agreement, the Board cannot impose contract provisions
31 "N.L.R.B. trial examiners are the 'trial judges' in unfair practice cases under
the National Labor Relations Act. In the ordinary 'complaint' proceeding, the trial
examiner presides at the hearing, controls the admission or exclusion of evidence,
makes preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law, . . ." 1970 GUIDEBOOK TO
LABOR RELATIONS 316 (10th ed. Commerce Clearing House Pub. 1970).
32 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 2 (trial examiner's decision).
33 It is not necessary that the successor have assumed the contract. The normal
principles of contract law which require assent on the part of the party who is
sought to be bound by the contract, do not apply to collective bargaining agree-
ments. John Wiley and Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); see notes 50-60
and accompanying text, infra.
84 441 F.2d at 916.
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on either party.8 5 The Second Circuit reasoned that since a suc-
cessor-employer has not contracted with the incumbent union, it isbeyond the Board's power to impose the contract upon either party.8"In reaching its determination that binding an unwilling successor
to its predecessor's bargaining agreement is inimical to nationallabor policy, the court relied on H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B.8"However, the Second Circuit misapplied the holding of H. K. Porter
on this point.
In order to correctly examine the holding of H. K. Porter, itis necessary to establish in what factual context the case arose. TheUnited Steelworkers Union was certified as the bargaining agent atPorter's Danville plant in 1961. The union began negotiating a con-
tract and as part of its demands requested a check-off clause.38 The
company refused to grant this demand because it did not want to
aid the union in its collection of dues. The Board found that the
company's reason for refusing to bargain over this issue violatedits duty to bargain in good faith. Therefore, the Board orderedPorter to bargain in good faith over the check-off clause. When
the company continued to refuse to bargain with regard to the
check-off clause, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia said that the Board could remedy this unfair labor practiceby compelling the company to grant the check-off clause.89 TheUnited States Supreme Court found that the Board lacked the power
to compel a company or union to agree to any substantive provision
of a contract.40 The Court in referring to section 8(d) of the LaborManagement Relations Act4 said it was intended that employers and
employees should reach agreements without government interference.The policy embodied in federal labor law is that the passions and
struggles of prior years should be resolved in bargaining. Hence,imposition of contract terms by the Board would violate establishedlabor policy.42 The Second Circuit reasoned that the principles em-bodied in H. K. Porter bound them to hold that imposing a contract
upon a successor violated national labor policy.4"
385 H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
86 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911, 915
(2d Cir. 1971).
87 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
88 A check-off clause is a device by which the employer makes a deduction ofthe employee's union dues from his paycheck and forwards that amount deductedto the union. J. WiLLIAMS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 635 (3d ed. 1965).89 H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
40 397 U.S. at 102.
41 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1947).
42 397 U.S. at 103.
48 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911, 915 (2dCir. 1971).
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While in the appropriate context4 4 the holding of the Supreme
Court should be applied, that context is not present in Burns. In
H. K. Porter the parties had not arrived at a bargaining agreement.
The method of arriving at agreements through collective bargaining
was established so that employers and employees could resolve their
conflicts in a peaceful manner. For an outside party to impose
contract terms would likely result in a mutually unsatisfactory agree-
ment, thus threatening labor peace.45
In Burns there was a collective bargaining agreement. Wacken-
hut bargained with the union and arrived at a contract which was
keyed to the same conditions of employment which now exist under
Burns. While Burns has not bargained with the union, Wackenhut,
whose interests were similar to Burns, has done so. Once a contract
has been established the Supreme Court acknowledges that industrial
peace is best accommodated by its enforcement.
46 The Court has
said, "It [section 301 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act] expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that
industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way."
47 Since
Burns has voluntarily "stepped into the shoes" of Wackenhut, the
policy of H. K. Porter should not apply.
Moreover, section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 194748 establishes a congressional policy that collective bar-
gaining agreements should continue in effect until their termination
date. Section 8(d) requires that, "[W]here there is in effect a
collective bargaining contract ... no party to such contract shall termi-
nate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termina-
tion or modification serves written notice upon the other party to the
contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days
prior to the expiration date thereof, . . ." Therefore, where a contract
is still in effect it should be applied to the successor.
The United States Supreme Court has established that an
H. K. Porter situation does not apply to circumstances where a
contract exists.4 1 In enforcing an arbitration clause against a suc-
cessor employer, the Court distinguished the situation where no
44 See notes 37-41 and accompanying text, supra.
45 See H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99 (1970). See generally Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
46 Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
47 Id.
48 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1947).
49 John Wiley and Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
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contract has been established: "This case cannot readily be assim-
ilated to the category of those in which there is no contract what-
ever, or none which is reasonably related to the party sought
to be obligated."50 Thus, it may be that the Second Circuit has
failed to distinguish Burns from the situation where there is no
contract. To remove the bargaining agreement, the instrument of
industrial stability, and replace it with the often hostile, disruptive
environment of collective bargaining is hardly the mandate of H. K.
Porter.
LIMITATION OF SUCCESSOR'S OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATION
The Board, in reaching its determination that Burns should be
bound by Wackenhut's contract, relied heavily on a United States
Supreme Court case, John Wiley and Sons v. Livingston,5 which
held that a successor-employer is bound by certain provisions of
his predecessor's bargaining agreement. In Wiley the union had
negotiated a contract with Interscience Publishers, Inc., which
was to terminate in 1962. In 1961 Interscience merged with John
Wiley and Sons, Inc. The union demanded that Wiley recognize
certain provisions of the Interscience contract.52 The union brought
suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act5" to compel Wiley to honor an arbitration clause
in the contract. The Supreme Court found that Wiley was re-
quired to arbitrate even though the contract had terminated.54 How-
ever, because the case was limited to the issue of arbitration, the
Court did not indicate whether the entire contract was enforceable.
The Board concluded that this case altered the perspective in which
a successor-employer's duty to honor his predecessor's contract must
be viewed.55
The Second Circuit has taken a narrower view of Wiley.
The court reasoned that the holding of the Supreme Court should
be construed only to impose arbitration upon a successor-employer. 56
50 Id. at 550.
51 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
52 The issues which the union sought to arbitrate were: (1) whether the
seniority rights of the predecessor's employees must be continued; (2) whether Wiley(the successor) had to continue to make payments to the union's security and pension
plans; (3) whether the job security and grievance provisions of the contract con-
tinued in effect; (4) whether Wiley was liable for severance pay under the contract;
and (5) whether Wiley was liable for vacation pay under the contract. Id. at 552.
53 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1959).
54 376 U.S. at 550.
55 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 5, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098, 1099 (1970).
56 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911, 916 (2d
Cir. 1971).
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The Second Circuit said that, "[T]he policy behind the decision
in Wiley was founded upon the Court's recognition of 'the central
role of arbitration in effectuating national labor policy.' The Court's
determination is only that 'the impressive policy considerations
favoring arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that
Wiley did not sign the contract being construed.' ,17
It is possible that the Second Circuit overlooked some very
important language in the Supreme Court's decision. The measuring
standard by which arbitration is imposed may be more than its
central role in national labor policy. The Supreme Court said in
Wiley that the sale or takeover of a business does not take into
account the interests of the employees. The employees stand to
lose greatly in a change of employers. Their seniority rights, pen-
sion plans, rates of pay, hours of employment, and jobs themselves
may be changed or terminated by a transfer of ownership. The
interests of employers in the free alienation of assets and employees
must be balanced by some protection to the employees. 8 In Wiley
arbitration was the protection granted to insure that the workers'
rights accrued under the contract with Interscience would be pre-
served.
To hold that Wiley is limited to arbitration misses the impact
of the Supreme Court's reasoning. If the Court is using a balancing
test to protect employees' rights, then the collective agreement is
the factor which should be weighed most heavily in favor of the
employee. Arbitration was a heavily weighted interest because it
could preserve national labor tranquility while it gave some degree
of protection to the employees' rights. But preservation of the em-
ployees' contractual rights, clearly established by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, is perhaps of greater importance because all
the employees' rights, including arbitration, are either grounded in
the agreement or are nonexistent.
The importance of the contract in preserving national labor
peace has been emphasized by the Supreme Court in Heinz Co. v.
N.L.R.B.,59 where the Court said that a labor contract stabilizes
57 Id. The Second Circuit is quoting the Supreme Court in Wiley. 376 U.S. at
549-550.
58 The Supreme Court said, "Employees, and the union which represents them,
ordinarily do not take part in the negotiations leading to a change in corporate
ownership. The negotiations will ordinarily not concern the well-being of the em-
ployees, whose advantage or disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be in-
cidental to the main considerations. The objectives of national labor policy, reflected
in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners
independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as em-
ployers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in
the employment relationship. 376 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
59 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
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labor relations.60 There must be some strong interest in favor of the
new employer in order to overcome the enforcement of the contract.
The fact that the new employer has not been able to bargain from his
various strengths and weaknesses would be such a factor if his prede-
cessor, who had similar interests and was in a similar position, had not
already bargained. The Board pointed out in Burns that it found
no inequity in requiring a successor to take over his predecessor's
contract. The Board recognized that the successor in the usual
case stands in the same position as the predecessor. The employer
can compensate for the obligation of the contract in the negotiations
for sale or in computing his bid. However, the employees cannot
make a similar adjustment." If the collective bargaining agreement
terminates with the sale, the employee must bargain anew for all of
his rights. This is an unfair burden upon the employee, hence the
contract should be enforced upon the successor.
HARDSHIP
The Second Circuit contends that the Board's rule in Burns
could result in serious inequities to the union because there would
be no choice but to be bound by the contract. The court cites the
example of a union which makes concessions to a failing company
in order to keep it in business only to have the successor turn out
to be a financially viable organization.6" The court says that in such
a case the union would be unfairly burdened by the contract.6" The
Board was also troubled by this dilemma, and attempted to solve
the problem in Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 4 wherein the Board
refused to bind the successor-employer to the predecessor's con-
tract.
The Board's Hardship Exception
In Emerald, servicing of housing and maintenance of roads at
Laredo Air Force Base were provided by independent contractors.
On a yearly basis the Defense Department requested bids and
awarded the contract to the lowest bidder. The Public Service, Pro-
duction and Maintenance Employees, Local Union No. 1057, was
certified by the Board as the bargaining agent for the employees
60 The Supreme Court said, "[Tihe signed agreement has been regarded as the
effective instrument of stabilizing labor relations and preventing through collective
bargaining, strikes and industrial strife." Id. at 524.
61 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 8,74 L.R.R.M. at 1101 (1970).
62 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911, 916
(2d Cir. 1971).
68 Id.
64 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971).
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who performed these services. The union signed a contract with
the Bartlett Company and the Rice Cleaning Service, the predeces-
sor companies, who were awarded the service contracts on April 1,
1969. The contracts included wage increases which were to take
effect six months after their service contract with the Defense
Department expired. In January of 1970, the Government asked for
bids for the work being performed by Rice and Bartlett. In com-
puting their bids for the work, prospective bidders were told by the
Comptroller General to use prevailing wage rates then in effect. Em-
erald Maintenance, the successor, was the low bidder, but in comput-
ing its bid Emerald did not include the wage increase the union had
negotiated with Rice and Bartlett. The Board found that Emerald
was a successor, but it refused to enforce the predecessor's collective
bargaining contract. The Board said that a mechanistic application
of its rule in Burns under the circumstances here would retard
rather than advance the goal of providing continuity of employ-
ment.65 If the contract were enforced it could cause Emerald to go
out of business. Emerald jusifiably relied upon the order of the
Comptroller General to use the wage scale currently being paid
rather than the increase called for in the contract.
It appears, therefore, that the Board allows for a case by case
analysis to determine if there is some legitimate hardship which
will relieve a successor from his obligation to honor his predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement. This rule should apply not only
to a successor-employer but also to the incumbent union for both
successor and union are bound by the existing contract. The Second
Circuit's example could be classified by the Board as a case in-
volving hardship upon the union. Hence, the union might be
relieved of its duty to honor the contract. This exception allows
for flexibility in applying the Board's rule in Burns to the myriad
of fact situations arising under it.
The Second Circuit Rejects Emerald Maintenance, Inc."6
The Second Circuit rejected the Board's approach to cases of
hardship because the rule in Emerald, "[M]erely arrogates to the
Board the additional power to pick and choose among the con-
tractural provisions it will impose on non-contracting parties." 7
The court is restating its misconceived idea that H. K. Porter Co.
v. N.L.R.B. 8 prohibits the Board from imposing the bargaining
65 Id. at 6, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
66 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971).
67 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 911, 916
(2d Cir. 1971).
68 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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agreement upon a successor-employer or a union because they have
not contracted between themselves. H. K. Porter is applicable where
there is no contract. But where there is an existing labor contract,
John Wiley and Sons v. Livingston 9 has established that a successor
and the union do not have to stand in the relationship of contracting
parties.7" In binding Wiley to the arbitration provision of its pre-
decessor's contract, the Supreme Court said, "While the principles
of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract
an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bar-
gaining agreement is not an ordinary contract. . . . [I]t is not in
any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship.'
Thus, the Board's power to bind or refuse to bind a successor-em-
ployer who has not agreed to accept his predecessor's contract is
well established, and the Board's rule in Emerald Maintenance,
Inc.72 appears valid.
CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
took a much too narrow view of the principles of federal labor
policy in reaching its conclusion in William J. Burns Int'l Detective
Agency v. N.L.R.B. 73 The United States Supreme Court in agreeing
to hear this case has an excellent opportunity to enunciate the
duties of a successor-employer based upon his predecessor's con-
tract. The decision of the Second Circuit endangers labor peace
by requiring labor and management to bargain anew. This redun-
dant action threatens to bring about economic sanctions in the
form of strikes and lockouts at a time in our economic history when
industrial stability is a goal much to be desired. In order to safe-
guard the established rights of employees, the Supreme Court should
overrule the Second Circuit's decision in Burns and establish that
it is a successor's duty to recognize the collective bargaining agree-
ment his predecessor has negotiated.
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71 376 U.S. at 550.
72 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971).
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